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IPO Allocations: Discriminatory or Discretionary? 
 
 
 
Abstract 
 
We estimate the structural links between IPO allocations, pre-market information production, 
and initial underpricing and find that 
• allocation policies favor institutional investors, both in the U.S. and worldwide 
• increasing institutional allocations results in offer prices that deviate more from the pre-
marketing price range 
• constraints on bankers’ discretion reduce institutional allocations and result in smaller price 
revisions, indicating diminished information production 
• initial returns are directly related to information production and inversely related to 
institutional allocations 
Our results indicate that discretionary allocations promote price discovery in the IPO market and 
reduce indirect issuance costs for IPO firms. 
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1. Introduction 
IPO allocation policies favor institutional investors. This is well known, although rather less 
well documented, in the U.S. In this paper, we show that the same is true worldwide. Averaging 
across 37 countries and 1,032 IPOs between 1990 and 2000, we find that share allocations to 
institutional investors are virtually double those received by retail investors. The available 
evidence from the U.S. indicates much the same (Hanley and Wilhelm, 1995; Aggarwal, 2000). 
How should this empirical fact be interpreted? In the U.S., allocation policies are discretionary 
– there are few rules to guide or constrain investment bankers. Outside the U.S., allocation 
discretion is frequently constrained and yet the end result, in allocations at least, appears much the 
same. Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) suggest that banker discretion can benefit issuers facing 
asymmetrically informed investors because such investors may be induced to reveal their 
information in return for favorable allocations. On the other hand, it is not hard to imagine bankers 
exercising discretion to favor institutional investors with whom they maintain long-term 
relationships. The open question is whether, on net, “discretionary” share allocation is beneficial 
or whether it should more accurately and pejoratively be thought of as a “discriminatory” practice 
that serves the bankers’ interests at the expense of other parties to the transaction.  
This question gained force on December 7, 2000 when the Wall Street Journal alleged that in 
exchange for IPO allocations, bankers require institutional investors to purchase shares in the 
secondary market or pay unusually high trading commissions.1 The Securities and Exchange 
Commission and the U.S. attorney’s office in Manhattan responded by announcing investigations 
to determine whether these allegedly common demands violate regulations barring tie-ins.  It is 
worth noting that discretionary use of either tactic provides for extracting a unique all-in ‘price’ 
                                                           
1 See Smith and Pulliam (“U.S. Probes Inflated Commissions for Hot IPOs”, Wall Street Journal, Dec. 7, 2000, p. C1) 
as well as subsequent articles. Also see the seven-part series beginning May 2, 2001 in Red Herring. 
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from each investor receiving an initial allocation and therefore could be interpreted as a means of 
(implicit) price discrimination. Explicit price discrimination in the sale of IPOs is prohibited in the 
U.S. as well as in most other jurisdictions.  
In this paper we attempt to shed light on the rather complex question of whether such 
discriminatory practices undermine primary market efficiency. The complexity begins with 
identifying an appropriate objective for pricing and allocation policies. The bulk of academic 
theory treats maximization of proceeds received by the issuer as the appropriate objective. 
Although there is merit in this assumption in the context of well-developed capital markets, it is 
less obviously appropriate for privatization IPOs or when it is hoped that broad share ownership 
will spur the development of secondary markets or serve some other public interest. Some might 
even argue for non-discriminatory allocations on egalitarian grounds regardless of the 
consequences for issuing firms. 
For the purpose at hand, we implicitly take proceeds maximization, net of issue costs, as the 
appropriate objective of a pricing and allocation policy. We believe this approach sheds more light 
on the ongoing debate in the U.S. and is increasingly germane to policymakers worldwide. But it 
also requires careful consideration of the source and magnitude of the indirect costs of issuance. 
Initial public offerings are typically discounted or “underpriced”, in the sense of large first-day 
price increases, and institutional investors are the primary beneficiaries.  
Benveniste and Spindt (1989) argue that this substantial indirect cost of bookbuilding reflects a 
quid pro quo arrangement with institutional investors whose non-binding bids or “indications of 
interest” provide the foundation for establishing the issuer’s offer price. Absent “compensation” 
(in the form of large allocations of underpriced shares), institutions would have little incentive to 
bid aggressively knowing that to do so would only drive up the offer price. But indiscriminate 
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allocation of underpriced shares rewards both informed (aggressive) and uninformed bidders. 
Although discriminatory allocation of underpriced shares diminishes the issuer’s proceeds from 
the offering ex post, in this view, expected proceeds are maximized (Benveniste and Wilhelm, 
1990; Sherman and Titman, 2000). The empirical predictions from this theory are that allocation 
constraints diminish information production and the issuer’s expected net proceeds (as 
underpricing is substituted for larger institutional allocations in the “compensation package” 
provided to institutional investors).2 
Alternatively, allocation discretion might aggravate an agency problem between the issuer and 
its banker (Baron, 1982) arising from the fact that bankers deal repeatedly with institutional 
investors but infrequently with issuers. Biais, Bossaerts, and Rochet (1999) examine this 
possibility by assuming that bankers and institutional investors collude to extract informational 
rents from issuers. Once again, the optimal price and allocation mechanism (from the issuer’s 
perspective) favors informed investors with discounted share allocations.3 However, in broad 
terms, agency problems related to allocation discretion can be hypothesized to undermine the 
issuer’s interests. Thus we might expect allocation constraints to diminish underpricing and lead to 
a complementary relation between initial returns and institutional allocations (as bankers curry 
favor among institutional investors by providing larger allocations in discounted offerings).  
                                                           
2 Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (1996) extend the analysis by showing that discretionary implementation of 
“penalty bids” designed to prevent immediate sale of initial share allocations by some investors can increase expected 
proceeds by providing another instrument for price discrimination. Bankers routinely attempt to prevent secondary 
market prices from declining below the offering price. In this context, penalty bids buoy secondary market prices by 
counterbalancing selling pressure. In other words, they are economically equivalent to the alleged demands from 
bankers that investors purchase shares in the secondary market in exchange for initial share allocations. But allowing 
some investors to sell at the offer price while preventing others from doing so, is also equivalent to providing some 
initial investors with put options in addition to their share allocations but withholding them from others. Thus for the 
same (offer) price, some investors receive shares and put options while others receive only shares. 
3 However, price discrimination is not optimal in this setting whereas both price and allocation discrimination can be 
optimal in the Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) setting. In a similar vein, Biais and Faugeron-Crouzet (2000) identify a 
parallel between France’s Mise en vente auctions and bookbuilding by establishing conditions under which both 
implement the optimal price and allocation mechanism. 
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Although the limited documentation of allocation policy in the literature appears consistent 
with the Benveniste and Spindt (1989) interpretation, it is premature to accept discretion as a good 
thing on the basis of these studies alone. Most empirical studies have focused on relatively narrow, 
reduced-form tests of the theory, often ignoring serious endogeneity problems, rather than testing 
the broader structure implied by the mechanism design perspective.4 In this paper, we estimate a 
structural model designed to put the mechanism design theory to a more severe test. One 
noteworthy finding is that the bookbuilding theory survives our test. 
Most existing tests of the bookbuilding theory have also been limited to the U.S. (Cornelli and 
Goldreich, 1999, 2000 are the noteworthy exceptions). The problem with U.S. data, apart from the 
general unwillingness of U.S. banks to share information about their allocation policies, is that it 
provides no useful alternative for comparison. Banks maintain full allocation discretion in all U.S. 
firm-commitment IPOs. Outside the U.S., bookbuilding practices have virtually supplanted the 
traditional fixed-price offering, and its pro rata allocation policy, in much of Continental Europe 
and increasingly in Asia (Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm, 2001). But these countries have 
also imposed a wide range of regulatory constraints on allocation policies. At one extreme, the 
German primary markets are increasingly dominated by bookbuilding practices and, like the U.S., 
impose few constraints on how shares are allocated. At the other extreme are countries like 
Australia where fixed price offerings with pro rata allocations are the default option given to 
issuing firms. In the middle lie countries like France and the United Kingdom where issuers can 
                                                           
4 See, for example, Hanley (1993). Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) and Cornelli and Goldreich (1999, 2000). These 
studies are constrained from estimating a structural model by the fact that they have allocation data only for a single 
bank. The structural test performed by Biais et al. (1999) suffers from limited data and, for our purposes, the fact that 
allocation policy in the Mise en vente, while discriminatory, provides bankers with limited discretion. By contrast, 
Ljungqvist, Jenkinson, and Wilhelm (2001), using data similar to ours, account for the econometric consequences of 
issuers selecting from a ‘menu’ of price and allocations mechanisms when they go public. 
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select from a range of underwriting practices and banks are subject to a variety of constraints on 
the discretion they exercise in the allocation of shares.  
This heterogeneity in allocation policy creates variation that increases the power of our 
structural econometric model. In turn, estimation sheds light on whether discretionary allocation is 
beneficial on net, and if so, under what circumstances. The following results should be of interest 
to policy makers:  
• Constraints on bankers’ allocation discretion reduce institutional allocations. 
• Constraints on allocation discretion result in offer prices that deviate less from the indicative 
price range established prior to bankers’ efforts to gauge demand among institutional 
investors. We interpret this as indicative of diminished information production. 
• Initial returns are directly related to this measure of information production and inversely 
related to the fraction of shares allocated to institutional investors. 
We tentatively conclude that discretionary allocation does not pose a net cost to issuers because it 
promotes price discovery in primary markets and diminishes the attendant costs of information 
acquisition. 
 
2. Sample and Data 
Our dataset spans the period January 1990 to May 2000 and covers a large fraction of the IPOs 
brought to market worldwide during the decade. The 1990s are noteworthy both for the high level 
of primary market activity and also as a period of unprecedented experimentation in the means by 
which issuing firms were marketed to investors. The sharp increase in global offerings required 
banks to develop mechanisms to appeal to a wide range of investor preferences and abide by a 
similarly wide range of regulatory constraints. By the end of the decade, a large fraction of IPOs 
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were carried out by methods that involved discretionary share allocation for at least part of the 
offering (Ljungqvist et al., 2001). 
 
2.1. Sample construction 
We assemble a large dataset of IPOs from a variety of sources, detailed below. While we do 
not have allocation data for every IPO in this dataset, we still require as comprehensive a dataset 
as possible, in order to derive certain measures of aggregate IPO activity for our econometric 
model. The econometric model, in turn, focuses on firms floating in four countries – France, 
Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. – which are subject to a wide range of constraints described later. 
Throughout the paper, observations per country refer to the number of firms going public in 
that country, including foreign issuers. We adopt this convention because rules on allocation 
discretion are formulated at the level of the country of listing, not the country of origin. Where a 
company lists in more than one country, we define its main listing as being in its home country, or 
if it only lists abroad as the country where the bulk of the offering is conducted. 
Specifically, the dataset consists of three parts, covering the 15 countries of the European 
Union (EU15), non-EU Europe, and Rest of the World. Throughout, we exclude IPOs by 
investment trusts, companies previously listed elsewhere, and introductions (listings not 
accompanied by the sale of securities, common in the U.K.). The EU15 part consists of 2,967 
IPOs and captures offerings anywhere in the world by firms based in an EU15 country as well as 
offerings in an EU15 country by firms based anywhere in the world: 
 
Issuers based in the 15 
European Union countries 
Issuers listing in the 15 
European Union countries 
Number of 
IPOs 
√ √ 2,861 
√ × 82 
× √ 24 
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  2,967 
 
These 2,967 offerings were identified from five principal sources:  
• the Equityware database (between January 1992 and July 1999) (see Ljungqvist et al., 2001, 
for further details);  
• the SDC Global New Issues database, from which we extract all IPOs not already covered in 
Equityware (619 cases, of which 324 were conducted before January 1992 or after July 1999);  
• information provided by European stock exchanges;  
• a search of every article in Reuters’ “Share issues” news archive for each EU15 country;  
• and Ljungqvist’s (1997) database of German IPOs.  
Every offering contained in these sources was checked for eligibility as a bona fide IPO against 
IPO prospectuses and regulatory filings because we found that SDC frequently misclassifies 
seasoned offerings as IPOs and double-counts IPOs under different names.5  
The EU15 sample is relatively comprehensive. In addition, we have access to a less 
comprehensive sample of 98 IPOs by issuers in non-EU Europe and 695 IPOs by issuers in the 
rest of the world (excluding the U.S.), over the period January 1992 to July 1999. These offerings 
were identified using Equityware.  
 
2.2. Allocation data 
The transparency of the distribution of shares between retail and institutional investors varies 
substantially across countries. Some countries follow the U.S. in not requiring this information to 
be made public. Until recently, this was the case in Germany, so to gather allocation data we 
                                                           
5 We are grateful to Wolfgang Aussenegg, Jan Jakobsen, François Derrien, and Giancarlo Giudici for looking over our 
Austrian, Danish, French, and Italian samples, respectively. 
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approached companies directly. There were 470 IPOs in Germany during our sample period. Of 
these, 377 were bookbuilding exercises, 92 were fixed-price offerings, and one was conducted by 
auction. See Appendix A for details of offering mechanisms and allocation rules in Germany. 
Bookbuilding became the dominant offering mechanism in 1995, accounting for 94% of 
German IPOs in 1995-2000. Our survey was conducted in May and June 2000 and targeted all 351 
firms which went public in Germany between January 1996 and March 2000 (we also contacted a 
sample of pre-1996 issuers in a trial but found that none would provide allocation data). 
Responses were received from 106 firms (30%). Of these, 93 disclosed their allocations, five said 
they no longer had the data, five were unwilling to make the data available, and three sent data 
pertaining to subsequent seasoned equity offerings. In addition, we received detailed allocation 
data for 36 IPOs from an underwriter (widely regarded as the market leader in IPOs on the Neuer 
Markt, Germany’s dominant primary market). Finally, we obtained allocation data for 15 
additional firms from press releases. This provides a sample of 144 IPOs in Germany for which 
allocation data are available, covering 38% of all IPOs since 1996. Three of these IPOs cannot be 
used in the econometric analysis for lack of indicative price ranges (two were fixed-price offerings 
and one was sold by auction).  
By contrast, in France the Bourse generally requires issuers to report allocations, though public 
availability of the notifications is patchy in the case of flotations on the over-the-counter markets. 
During the sample period there were 516 IPOs in France. 28 went public on the Premier Marché, 
247 on the Second Marché, 124 on the Nouveau Marché, and 117 on an OTC market (the Paris 
Marché Libre, its predecessor, the Marché Hors-Cote, or the OTC markets in Lyon and Nantes). 
Of these, 255 were pure or hybrid bookbuilding exercises, 44 were fixed-price offers, and 185 
were conducted via auctions; 32 OTC offerings could not be classified (though they are likely to 
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be auctions). See Appendix B for details of offering mechanisms and allocation rules in France. 
Allocation data for auctions are not publicly available. Among non-auctions, we obtain allocation 
data from the Bourse for 237 of the 255 bookbuilding efforts, and 7 of the 44 fixed-price offers. In 
total, we thus have allocation data for 244 issues. This covers virtually the entire population of 
bookbuilt IPOs, and about half of all French IPOs during the sample period. Seven of the 
bookbuilt IPOs are excluded from the econometric analysis for lack of indicative price ranges. 
In the U.K., there were 876 IPOs on the London Stock Exchange between January 1990 and 
May 2000. 515 went public on the Official List, 19 on the Unlisted Securities Market (USM, from 
1990 to 1995), and 342 on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM, from June 1995 to May 
2000). We exclude companies transferring from one London market tier to another (including 
from the Rule 535.2 or 4.2 trading facility which replaced the Third Market), companies traded on 
Ofex (an unregulated trading facility operated by J.P. Jenkins, a firm of stockbrokers), and 
introductions (listings not accompanied by the sale of securities). 
As discussed in Appendix C, U.K. offerings can be categorized as ‘placings’ (651 cases), 
‘public offers’ (12 cases), ‘hybrids’ (which combine a placing with a public offer; 178 cases), or 
‘global offers’ (which combine a listing in London with one abroad, usually in the U.S.; 35 cases). 
Allocation policies for the first two are virtually binary. Placings are not registered for offering to 
the public at large and so involve only institutional investors or extremely wealthy individuals. In 
some instances, placings set aside a proportion of shares for employees. On the other hand, public 
offers, which are allocated on a pro-rata basis or by ballot, are nearly exclusively a retail 
phenomenon. We were able to obtain allocation data for 186 of the 213 hybrid or global offers 
from the London Stock Exchange, which like the Paris Bourse requires publication of the ‘basis 
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for allocation’. In addition, we know the allocations for all placings and most public offers, giving 
a total of 843 IPOs for which allocation data are available. 
To provide a link to the published literature on IPO allocations, which uses U.S. data, we 
include a sample of IPOs in the United States. U.S. banks and issuers are not required to reveal 
how shares were allocated across various investor clienteles. However, we have access to a small 
sample of 30 U.S. firms taken public in the U.S. by Goldman Sachs between March 1993 and July 
1995, as well as two European firms which went public in the U.S. This sample does not overlap 
with those previously used by Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) and Aggarwal (2000). 
For all four countries, our allocation data reflect the aggregate allocations of the entire 
syndicate, rather than – as in Hanley and Wilhelm (1995) and Aggarwal (2000) – of the lead 
manager only. Our data thus allow us to more precisely measure allocation policy than is the case 
in the extant literature. 
Our econometric model focuses on the IPOs in the four countries just described. In addition, 
we have allocation data for 426 IPOs in other countries which we include for descriptive purposes. 
For some countries (for instance Finland), the data come from filings with the local stock 
exchange. For the remainder, we rely on information about the final tranche structure in hybrid 
deals to infer retail and institutional allocations. 6  
 
                                                           
6 Suppose the issuer announces tranches of 1 million shares for retail investors and 2 million shares for institutions. 
This information is typically contained in the preliminary offering prospectus. Depending on local rules, the issuer 
may or may not reallocate between tranches in the light of relative demands. On the assumption that institutions do 
not submit bids pretending they are retail investors, and vice versa, we use the final tranche sizes to compute the 
institutional/retail split (taking into account the overallotment option, which frequently benefits institutions). 
Information regarding final tranche sizes is obtained from issuer reports to their stock exchange or press 
announcements by the underwriter or the issuer. Given this procedure, we are unable to infer allocations in non-hybrid 
offerings in cases where no voluntary or mandatory disclosure takes place. 
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3. A Global Perspective on IPO Allocations 
Table 1 reports summary statistics for institutional allocations in our sample, broken down by 
country of listing. With few exceptions among the countries for which we have more than a few 
observations, institutional allocations outnumber retail allocations by something in the 
neighborhood of 2 or 3 to 1, on average, when banks have discretion in how shares are allocated. 
For example, institutions receive 76% of IPO shares in France and 73% in those U.K. IPOs which 
are open to both institutional and retail investors. In the small sample of Goldman-backed U.S. 
IPOs, institutions take 66% of the average offer. On the other hand, German IPOs yield slightly 
lower discretionary allocations to institutions of about 58% on average. Across the 1,689 IPOs for 
which we have allocation data, the average institutional allocation is 80%, though this reflects the 
large number of U.K. placings. Excluding these, the average drops to 69%. 
In the remainder of the paper, we focus on IPOs in France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S. 
Because we do not have allocation data for every IPO in these countries, we are concerned about 
the potential for sample selection bias. As a first cut, Table 2 provides, for each of the four 
countries, summary statistics regarding offer size, underpricing, allocations to institutions, and the 
number of privatizations. For each country, we test for differences in means or medians between 
the full country sample (column [1]) and the sample for which we have allocation data (column 
[2]). This reveals no significant differences in Germany or the U.K. In France, median gross 
proceeds is significantly higher amongst firms for which we have allocation data, reflecting the 
fact that smaller issuers are more likely to use an auction to price their securities. To see how 
representative our small U.S. sample is, we compare it to an SDC-generated sample of 2,353 
common-stock IPOs in the U.S. between January 1990 and May 2000 which were lead-managed 
by ‘top-tier’ banks (ranked 8.75 or higher on Carter and Manaster’s 9-point scale). The U.S. 
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offerings for which we have allocation data are significantly larger than the average or median 
U.S. IPO lead-managed by a top bank, and are a little less underpriced.  
Availability of allocation data is only a necessary condition for inclusion in our econometric 
model. In addition, we require data on the initial price range in order to measure the degree of 
price discovery in the pre-market. This requirement reduces the number of available IPOs from 
843 to 231 in the U.K. (where indicative price ranges have not traditionally been disclosed 
publicly), with negligible losses in France (from 244 to 237) and Germany (from 144 to 141). 
Table 2 also provides tests for differences between the sample for which we have allocation data 
(column [2]) and the reduced sample for which we have both allocation and price range 
information (column [3]). There are some significant differences among U.K. offerings, which 
treble in terms of average and median offer size. This is largely due to the fact that we lack 
indicative price ranges for many placings. Before 1996, placings were confined to smaller issues 
(up to £15 million till December 1993, up to £25 million till December 1995), while larger issuers 
were compelled to use a hybrid. Due to the attrition amongst placings, average institutional 
allocations fall from 93% in column [2] to 86.3% in column [3]. We are also more likely to have 
allocation and price range data for privatizations, not surprisingly given their larger size.  
Across the four countries, the average company raises $75 million, the median $28 million, 
and underpricing averages 26%. Amongst the 641 firms for which we have both allocation and 
price range information, the average company raises $215 million, the median $31 million, and 
underpricing averages 22%. Given these patterns, we need to take sample selectivity bias 
seriously. We will outline a Heckman (1979) selectivity correction in Section 6. 
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4. The Determinants and Consequences of Allocation Policy  
The empirical framework used to analyze the 641 IPOs in France, Germany, the U.K., and the 
U.S. described in Table 2 derives from Benveniste and Spindt (1989). Benveniste and Spindt view 
discretionary allocation as a key element of the investment bank’s effort to extract private 
information from potential investors prior to setting the offer price for an IPO. Allocation policy, 
in turn, is influenced by these strategic considerations and various constraints imposed by the 
regulatory regime under which the IPO is conducted. In the remainder of this Section we outline 
the theory underpinning these elements of the econometric model and conclude with a discussion 
of the identification and estimation of the implied system of equations describing the market. The 
precise definitions of all our variables can be found in Table 3. 
 
4.1. Price discovery in primary markets 
By price discovery in primary markets we mean the degree to which prior expectations 
regarding the value of the offering, reflected in preliminary filings with the issuer’s regulator, are 
revised in response to feedback from investors and the market at large before the offer price is set. 
Thus we think of the offer price as reflecting a conditional expectation representing the 
culmination of primary market price discovery. The literature has proposed two main proxies for 
the learning reflected in the difference between these conditional and unconditional expectations. 
Cornelli and Goldreich (2000) define the variable Revision = (Offer Price – Plow) / (Phigh – Plow), 
where Phigh and Plow are the upper and lower bounds of the indicative price range generally filed 
with the issuer’s regulator prior to seeking feedback from institutional investors in the course of 
bookbuilding. Hanley (1993) measures learning instead as Offer Price / [½(Phigh + Plow)] – 1. To 
ensure our results are easily comparable to the related clinical analysis in Cornelli and Goldreich 
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(2000), we follow their approach. The only consequence of this scaling decision is a slight 
increase in standard errors over those obtained using Hanley’s approach.  
By construction, Revision = ½ if the offer price is set at the midpoint of the price range, 
indicating that no new information has emerged. Revision is negative if the offer is priced below 
the range, 0 if priced at Plow, 1 if priced at Phigh, and greater than 1 if priced above the range. In our 
data, Revision averages 0.68 in France, 0.84 in Germany, 0.49 in the U.K., and 0.74 in the U.S. 
Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2001) argue that issuers learn not only through their own 
marketing efforts but also through those of their rivals. In other words, price discovery is a 
function of both deal-specific information and information spilling over from contemporaneous 
transactions and perhaps secondary market activity. (For empirical evidence consistent with this 
prediction, see Lowry and Schwert, 2000; Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu, 2001.) 
Spillover effects from contemporaneous transactions are controlled by the mean, m_RevisionBB, 
and standard deviation, σ_RevisionBB, of price revisions for contemporaneous IPOs in the same 
local market. The volatility measure, σ_RevisionBB, is included to control for noise and 
idiosyncratic information reflected in contemporaneous revisions. In other words, if 
contemporaneous IPOs are subject to a common information factor, we assume that the influence 
of this common information on price revisions is comparable in magnitude across IPOs. 
Deviations from the mean reflect noise or idiosyncratic factors that reduce the precision of 
learning about the common factor.  
IPO i’s contemporaries are defined as all local IPOs that were priced between the dates for 
setting i’s indicative price range and finalizing its offer price. If there are no contemporaneous 
IPOs, or none that use bookbuilding, m_RevisionBB and σ_RevisionBB are set to ½ and 0 
respectively (our results are robust to using windows of fixed width which have the advantage of 
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reducing the occurrence of no contemporaneous IPOs). All measures of contemporaneous activity 
are estimated using the full country samples described in column [1] of Table 2.  
We refer to the period between the setting of the indicative price range and the final offer price 
as the bookbuilding phase and subscript all variables defined during this period by ‘BB’.7 The 
bookbuilding phase averages 15 calendar days in France, 11 days in Germany, and 17 days in the 
U.K. (see Appendix D). If spillovers from contemporaneous offerings are substantial, we expect a 
positive relation between Revision and m_RevisionBB. However, when the signal-to-noise ratio for 
information generated by contemporaneous offerings is low, less learning occurs and so Revision 
should be negatively related to σ_RevisionBB.  
In the Benveniste-Spindt framework, discounted share allocations constitute the compensation 
provided in exchange for investors’ private information. Other things equal, large price revisions, 
reflecting a greater yield of private information, will carry the expectation of a larger discount. 
This is the well-documented ‘partial adjustment’ phenomenon observed in both the U.S. (Hanley, 
1993; Lowry and Schwert, 2000; Loughran and Ritter, 2001) and worldwide (Ljungqvist et al., 
2001). The partial adjustment phenomenon also suggests that if spillovers are important, 
contemporaneous revisions tell only part of the story. In isolation, a moderate positive 
contemporaneous revision might be interpreted as revealing only a moderate amount of 
information. But if it is coupled with a large initial return, the Benveniste-Spindt framework 
predicts the combination reflects a strong positive response. We control for this effect by including 
                                                           
7 We use the precise dates on which the price range and the offer price were set in each case. Note that these generally 
precede the announcement date by a day or two. Since we are here interested in the information set of the issuer and 
not of outside investors, we collect the earlier dates. We obtained these as follows: in France, from the market 
regulator (the Commission des Opérations de Bourse) and the Paris Bourse; in Germany, from the final IPO 
prospectus (which recapitulates the sequence of events); in the U.K., from the London Stock Exchange’s Regulatory 
News Service and from the ‘expected timetable of principal events’ in the ‘pathfinder’ (preliminary) prospectus. In the 
U.S., we use SEC filing and effective dates from Securities Data Company.  
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the mean of the one-day initial return of all local IPOs whose first trading day occurs during IPO 
i’s bookbuilding phase, m_IRBB, in addition to the contemporaneous revision variables. 
Secondary market spillovers are measured by the return to a local market index during each 
IPO’s bookbuilding phase (MktRetBB) as well as the standard deviation of daily index returns 
during the same period (σ_MktBB). The rationale for including σ_MktBB mirrors that for 
σ_RevisionBB. Although large market movements might be reflective of the arrival of considerable 
new information bearing on an IPO’s offer price, when volatility is high it is difficult to tease out 
its implications. So again, IPO i’s price revision should be directly related to MktRetBB and 
negatively related to σ_MktBB.  
Controlling for these potential spillover effects, Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990) predict that 
banker discretion promotes price discovery. The banker’s level of discretion differs across the four 
countries and, in the case of France and the U.K., within countries. The various options facing 
issuers in France, Germany and the U.K. are outlined in Appendices A-C. Since it is impossible to 
quantify the relative discretion granted to bankers across deals we define two categories of 
constraints on banker discretion and outline these in Table 4. Classification is based on the 
operative rules announced in the preliminary prospectus or regulatory filings.  
Our first category of constraints includes deals subject to a variety of constraints limiting 
banker discretion in offerings open to both retail and institutional investors. For example, fixed-
tranche deals in France and the U.K., where allocations for different classes of investors are fixed 
in advance of the bookbuilding effort, clearly remove a degree of freedom that might prove 
valuable in the mechanism-design framework. Similarly, some hybrid transactions, particularly in 
the U.K., include an automatic clawback provision triggered by retail demand. In essence, such 
provisions enable retail investors to condition their demand on feedback received from 
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institutional investors. When institutional demand is strong, retail investors can follow suit and the 
clawback provision calls for the banker to reassign shares to retail investors that otherwise would 
have been assigned to institutional investors. But institutional investors, recognizing that strong 
indications of interest will only cause them to be crowded out by retail investors, will have weaker 
incentives to step forward with strong indications in the first place. Finally, the sample includes 7 
French fixed-price offerings, which (perhaps surprisingly) post an indicative price range enabling 
their inclusion in the analysis. These fixed-price offerings provide underwriters with no discretion 
because shares are simply allocated on a pro rata basis. In total, 18 French and 87 UK offerings 
fall within our first category of constraints which we designate with the dummy variable 
BB_constraints. 
The estimation sample also includes 126 U.K. placings that can only be sold to institutional 
investors (ignoring the fact that ten of these set aside between ½% and 20% of the offer for their 
employees). These offerings are designated with the dummy variable BB_placings. In this setting, 
retail investors no longer provide the fallback in bargaining with institutional investors envisioned 
by Benveniste and Wilhelm (1990). For example, suppose the underwriter had reason to believe 
that investors were deliberately understating their demand in hopes of forcing a lower price. The 
optimal response in the Benveniste-Spindt framework is to reduce institutional allocations by 
allocating more to retail investors. However, deliberately misrepresenting positive views is not an 
optimal response to the underwriter’s optimal response, and so this is not a Nash equilibrium – 
unless there are constraints on the underwriter’s ability to switch allocations to retail investors. In 
the presence of constraints, misrepresenting positive views may be a Nash strategy, to the extent 
that the institutions’ profits on their reduced (but nonzero) allocations are greater than the profits 
from truthful revelation of their information. One plausible constraint is that there aren’t enough 
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retail investors and so some institutions receive nonzero allocations. In U.K. placings the offering 
is not registered for sale to retail investors and so we have the worst-case scenario. Although this 
is a constraint on the banker’s capacity for eliciting information from institutional investors neither 
its absolute magnitude nor its magnitude relative to that of the constraints captured by 
BB_constraints are clear a priori.8  
The remaining offerings are classified as unconstrained bookbuilding efforts. In addition to 
U.S. and German IPOs, this category also includes dual-tranche deals which do not pre-commit 
the underwriter to particular tranche sizes, as in U.K. ‘global offers’ which typically state that the 
final tranche structure is to be decided after the offer closes, or French hybrid bookbuilding efforts 
which provide for the possibility of clawback (usually but not exclusively in favor of retail 
investors) but leave the decision whether to exercise the clawback option with the underwriter. 
Finally, note that the banker in the Benveniste-Spindt framework simultaneously determines 
how much to allocate to investors who relinquish private information and how much to revise the 
offer price in response, so what we observe is the equilibrium combination of price (Revision) and 
quantity (allocations). We therefore let Revision depend on allocations to institutional investors.  
Even after controlling for the level of explicit constraints on discretion, local custom or other 
circumstances might influence banker expectations regarding their capacity to favor certain 
investors in exchange for information. We therefore normalize ex post institutional allocations by 
the average institutional allocation in contemporaneous offerings (local offerings during the three 
months preceding firm i’s IPO). This variable, which we call Inst_Alloc, will be greater than 1 if 
                                                           
8 If this argument is correct and it is more difficult to induce truthful revelation in placings, the problem should be 
attenuated if there exist other sources of leverage over the participating institutional investors. For instance, if the 
underwriter deals repeatedly with the same institutions, it may credibly threaten to cease future dealings with an 
institution perceived as deliberately misrepresenting its demand. Consistent with this argument, we find that placings 
are associated with smaller revisions but that the effect is mitigated, the greater the lead manager’s market share. 
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institutions are allocated more than is ‘normal’ in that market at that time. We assume that for 
U.K. placings the normal allocation is 1. Our normalization enables us to pool data from across 
countries but assumes that allocation practices are comparable across countries after regulatory 
and other differences are controlled. Later we test this assumption and examine the robustness of 
our results to alternative specifications. Clearly, Inst_Alloc is endogenous according to the 
Benveniste-Spindt framework, and our estimation will control for this.  
In summary, the model of primary market price discovery to be estimated is:  
 
 Revision = f1(Inst_Alloc, m_RevisionBB, σ_RevisionBB, MktRetBB, σ_MktBB,  
         m_IRBB, BB_constraints, BB_placings) (1) 
 
4.2. Allocation policy 
We assume that institutions are the primary source of any information extracted in the course 
of a bookbuilding effort and take Inst_Alloc as a reflection of the banker’s allocation strategy (see 
Cornelli and Goldreich, 1999, for evidence). Thus large price revisions, if they derive from such 
information, should be associated with large institutional allocations, other things equal. 
Moreover, there is likely to be a non-linearity in this relation: particularly valuable information 
requires particularly favorable allocations to induce investors to truthfully reveal their information. 
We therefore include both Revision and Revision+, the latter being equal to Revision whenever the 
offering is priced above the range, and zero otherwise. As argued earlier, price revisions should be 
viewed as being chosen simultaneously with allocations, so both Revision and Revision+ will be 
treated as endogenous. 
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Large IPOs provide more currency for compensating informed investors and so may diminish 
the fraction of the offering they will expect. We control for this effect by including the variable 
Proceeds, defined as the natural log of gross proceeds raised in the offering (converted into U.S. 
dollars using exchange rates on the pricing day). This variable too is endogenous if issuers aim to 
minimize wealth losses associated with their offerings (Habib and Ljungqvist, 2001), and will 
therefore be treated as endogenous in the estimation.  
We do not control separately for the regulatory constraints BB_constraints and BB_placings 
on allocations because our dependent variable Inst_Alloc measures institutional allocations relative 
to what is ‘normal’ in the local market, and so already takes into account the presence of 
constraints.9 We do, however, include a dummy variable indicating whether the offering was the 
result of a privatization of a state-owned firm. This reflects the fact that privatizations were quite 
commonly used as instruments of public policy aimed at broadening domestic share ownership or 
employee ownership (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist, 2001). Either would tend to favor retail investors. 
Thus the model specification for the banker’s allocation policy is:10 
 
 Inst_Alloc = f2(Revision, Revision+, Proceeds, Privatization) (2) 
 
4.3. Initial Returns 
In the Benveniste-Spindt framework, discounted share allocations constitute the compensation 
provided in exchange for investors’ private information. Other things equal, large price revisions, 
                                                           
9 Our results are not significantly changed when we include the two constraints dummies in the allocation equation (χ2 
test of equal coefficients across the two specifications: 8.56 with p-value 0.99). 
10 Allocations might also depend on initial returns: with greater allocations to institutions, underpricing need not be as 
high to compensate informed investors. However, while we find evidence that initial returns are significantly related 
to institutional allocations, we do not find that institutional allocations are significantly related to initial returns. This 
is consistent with underwriters setting allocation policy before setting pricing policy. 
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reflecting a greater yield of private information, will carry the expectation of a larger discount. 
Again, there is likely to be a non-linearity in this relation: particularly valuable information 
requires some combination of favorable allocations and initial return to induce information 
revelation. We therefore include both Revision and Revision+ in the initial return model.  
Holding the quantity of information revealed constant and assuming institutional investors are 
the source of this information, the percentage discount should be negatively related to the fraction 
of shares allocated to institutional investors. In other words, investors’ incentive compatibility 
constraint for sharing their information demands a minimum dollar compensation that can be 
satisfied by infinitely many combinations of share price and quantity. Again, we do not control 
separately for the regulatory constraints BB_constraints and BB_placings. Rather, their effect on 
underpricing occurs indirectly through their effect on Revision and Inst_Alloc. Unreported tests 
indicate that the regulatory constraints do not have an independent, direct effect on underpricing. 
Benveniste and Spindt argue that underwriters can reduce underpricing by ‘bundling’ deals.11 
Essentially, a higher deal flow affords underwriters the opportunity to cut off informed investors 
from other, lucrative deals as punishment for misrepresenting their private information. Higher 
(expected) deal flow should therefore lead to a lower marginal cost of acquiring information. 
Similarly, and Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm (2001) argue that during periods of high IPO 
volume, there is greater potential for issuers sharing the costs of information production, again 
leading to lower required underpricing returns.  
We control for this effect with two variables. IPOVol, which captures aggregate deal flow, is 
defined as the number of local IPOs in the six weeks before to two weeks after the present IPO’s 
pricing date. We include volume after the pricing date to allow for expectations regarding 
                                                           
11 See Sherman (2000), especially proposition 2, for an elaboration of this point. 
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bundling with deals that are already in the pipeline. Clearly the eight-week window is arbitrary; 
experimenting with different window sizes, we find that the results become progressively weaker 
the longer the window, but are not qualitatively altered with shorter windows. Our second variable 
is IBmktshare, which is defined as the lead manager’s (or if more than one, the average of the lead 
managers’) market share in the local market. IBmktshare may capture either bank-specific deal 
flow or the lead manager’s reputation and thus certification ability. In either case, we expect it to 
be negatively related to initial returns. We treat IBmktshare as potentially endogenous, for it is 
possible that issuers choose their underwriters endogenously. Indeed, Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) 
show that treating underwriter choice as exogenous leads to the erroneous inference that more 
prestigious underwriters are associated with higher underpricing in the U.S. in the 1990s. Again, 
we use the full country samples to derive these variables.  
Unlike in the U.S., where deals are typically priced only a few hours before trading begins, 
there is a substantial lag between pricing and trading in the three European countries (see 
Appendix D for details). During this post-pricing phase, further information could arrive from the 
secondary market, in the form of general market movements and spillovers from other IPOs that 
have begun trading in the meantime. We attempt to capture such information using MktRet post-
pricing, the market return between IPO i’s pricing date and its fifth trading day (to coincide with our 
measurement of Initial Returns, see below), the post-pricing market volatility σ_Mkt post-pricing, and 
m_IR post-pricing, the average first-day return of all local offerings which open during this period. 
Finally, we aim to control for firm-specific valuation uncertainty in three ways. Privatization 
IPOs generally involve more mature firms for which, presumably, more information is in the 
public domain, so their discounts may be smaller if discounts are at least in part compensation for 
private information. By the same reasoning, younger firms and firms in high-technology industries 
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may be harder to value and thus carry higher initial returns. We therefore include a dummy for 
privatization IPOs, the natural log of one plus firm age at the time of the IPO, and a dummy which 
equals one for firms whose principal activities are in a high-tech industry. Since our sample cuts 
across countries, there is no consistent SIC code for assigning firms to the high-tech category. 
Instead, we base our assignments on a reading of the business description published in each firm’s 
prospectus. On this basis, 232 of the 641 firms are classified as high-tech. These firms operate in 
the following range of industries: biotech, pharmaceuticals, medical instruments, software and 
hardware development, communications technology, advanced electronics, and specialty 
chemicals. In addition, we classify internet-related businesses as high-tech.12,13 This yields the 
following model for initial returns:  
 
 Initial Return = f3(Revision, Revision+, Inst_Alloc, IPOVol, IBmktshare,  
 MktRet post-pricing, σ_Mkt post-pricing, m_IR post-pricing,  
 Privatization, Age, Hightech) (3) 
where Initial Return is defined as the percentage return from the offer price to the closing price on 
the fifth trading day following listing. This is the same convention used by Ljungqvist et al. (2001) 
to obviate problems arising when daily price changes are subject to regulatory limits, as for 
instance in France. After-market prices were obtained from Datastream and Equityware for non-
U.S. offerings and from CRSP for U.S. offerings.  
                                                           
12 Another popular proxy for uncertainty is offer size. This is a curious proxy, for it is clearly endogenous to the offer 
price. Moreover, Habib and Ljungqvist (1998) prove that as a matter of identities, underpricing is strictly decreasing 
in offer size even when holding uncertainty constant. We thus refrain from using it. 
13 Hanley (1993) uses the width of the price range as a proxy for valuation uncertainty. In our data, this variable has 
no significant effect and we therefore exclude it from the model. 
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As an alternative to Eq. (3), we estimate the impact of allocation policy on dollar 
underpricing, that is the total amount of money ‘left on the table’: 
 
 Dollar Underpricing = f3(Revision, Revision+, Inst_Alloc, IPOVol, IBmktshare, 
 MktRet post-pricing, σ_Mkt post-pricing, m_IR post-pricing,  
 Privatization, Age, Hightech) (3’) 
 
where Dollar Underpricing equals Initial Return times the dollar gross proceeds. To a first 
approximation, maximizing the net proceeds of the offer (and thus the issuer’s wealth) is 
equivalent to minimizing Dollar Underpricing.14 Following the argument in Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001), the optimum is characterized by the issuer and its banker having chosen their allocation 
policy such that informed investors are just compensated for the value of disclosing their private 
information. A test for the optimality of allocation policies in our data can be based on the 
coefficient for Inst_Alloc in Eq. (3’), which captures the partial derivative of Dollar Underpricing 
with respect to institutional allocations. At the optimum, the partial derivative must be zero and so 
a zero coefficient for Inst_Alloc in Eq. (3’) is consistent with issuers having chosen the allocation 
policy which minimizes Dollar Underpricing.15 A nonzero coefficient can be interpreted as 
follows. If informed investors expect too little compensation relative to the value of their private 
information, less information discovery will ensue in the pre-market, leading to a negative relation 
between Dollar Underpricing and Inst_Alloc: more money is left on the table, the less is allocated 
                                                           
14 It is an approximation, for it ignores the dilution effect of selling new (primary) shares at a discount. For further 
details, see Habib and Ljungqvist (2001).  
15 Demsetz and Lehn (1985) first proposed this optimality test in the context of executive ownership. Note that it does 
not follow that the coefficient on Inst_Alloc in Eq. (3), which has percent underpricing on the left-hand side, should 
also be zero, if issuers are minimizing dollar rather than percent underpricing. 
 
  
25 
 
to institutions. If, on the other hand, underwriters favor institutions with large allocations beyond 
the point where the issuer benefits from information production, perhaps in the expectation of 
kickbacks, Dollar Underpricing would increase in Inst_Alloc.  
 
4.4. Estimation 
The two models defined by the three structural Eqs (1)-(3) and (1)-(3’) cannot be estimated 
using ordinary least squares, for each equation includes amongst its explanatory variables the 
dependent variable of one or both of the other equations. Specifically, the Initial Return is 
endogenous to IBmktshare and to both Revision and Inst_Alloc, which in turn are endogenous to 
each other and to Proceeds, which is endogenous to the offer price and thus related to both Initial 
Return and Revision. This has two consequences. First, it causes the endogenous variables to be 
correlated with the disturbances, leading to biased coefficients when estimated using OLS. 
Second, since some of the explanatory variables are the dependent variables of other equations in 
the system, the error terms are expected to be correlated across equations, leading OLS standard 
errors to be biased upwards. Three-stage least squares (3SLS) provides consistent estimates of the 
coefficients and standard errors, as long as the model is identified, that is, if there is sufficient 
information to estimate the parameters of the structural model.16 A necessary condition for 
identification is that the number of exogenous variables excluded from an equation is at least as 
large as the number of endogenous variables included in that equation. This ‘order condition’ is 
satisfied in our model.  
 
                                                           
16 For further details, see Greene, 2000, pp. 692–693. 
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5. Results 
5.1. Price discovery in primary markets 
Table 5 summarizes the 3SLS estimates of the model’s structural parameters. The Revision 
equation yields several insights. Other things equal, constraints on allocation discretion result in 
smaller revisions relative to the indicative price range. Relative to unconstrained offerings, 
constraints on the split between retail and institutional investors reduce average revisions by 0.21 
(p-value=3.8%) while shutting out retail investors ex ante reduces average revisions by 0.29 
(p<1%). These are large effects, bearing in mind that the mean of Revisions is 0.65. They are also 
similar in magnitude and, in fact, are not statistically different. 
Institutional allocations (relative to expectation) have a positive and significant (p=4.7%) 
effect on price revisions after allowing for the simultaneity between the two and controlling for 
regulatory constraints. This is consistent with the idea that, relative to retail investors, institutions 
are a valuable source of information. To illustrate the economic magnitude of the effect, consider a 
one standard deviation increase in institutional allocations from the mean. This will increase 
Revisions from 0.65 to 0.87, holding all other covariates at their sample means. This effect is 
stronger than that measured by Hanley (1993) and Hanley and Wilhelm (1995). However, if we 
follow their lead by treating allocation policy as exogenous, the coefficient switches sign. This 
illustrates the extent of the simultaneity bias in treating allocations as exogenous. 
The positive and significant coefficient (p=2.4%) estimated for m_RevisionBB is consistent with 
information revealed in contemporaneous offerings spilling over into the price discovery process. 
However, the economic magnitude of the effect is smaller than that of allocation policy: a one 
standard deviation increase in m_RevisionBB from the mean increases Revisions from 0.65 to only 
0.71. At the same time, the negative coefficient estimated for σ_RevisionBB (p<0.1%) is consistent 
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with our prediction that the noisier is the information coming from other offerings, the less the 
offer price is increased relative to the indicative range. Underpricing of other deals during the 
bookbuilding phase, as measured by m_IRBB, also appears to spill over. The coefficient is positive 
and significant (p<0.1%), but its economic magnitude is again relatively small. A two-quartile 
increase in contemporaneous underpricing, from the 1st quartile of 3.9% to the 3rd quartile of 24%, 
increases average Revisions from 0.6 to 0.64.  
The coefficient estimated for MktRetBB is positive, as predicted, but not significant at 
conventional levels (p=13.8%), while that for σ_MktBB is significantly negative (p<0.1%). The 
former suggests that secondary market information, which is of course public, has only a weak 
influence when setting the offer price. The latter suggests that volatility in secondary markets – 
like volatility in the primary market – affects price discovery negatively, and its economic effect is 
quite large: a one standard deviation increase in volatility reduces Revisions from 0.65 to 0.57.  
 
5.2. Allocation policy 
The allocation equation yields one key insight: institutions are rewarded with above-normal 
allocations in return for revealing valuable information, the more so, the more positive the 
information. This is evidenced by the positive and significant coefficients for Revision (p<1%) and 
Revision+ (p=1%). Other things equal, the expected cost of eliciting private information from 
investors is minimized when discounts are concentrated in states characterized by uniformly 
strong interest among investors which, presumably, are associated with the largest positive price 
revisions. This strategy minimizes leakage of surplus to investors providing weak indications of 
interest and therefore avoids undermining incentives for optimistic investors to be forthright with 
their opinions. To illustrate the economic magnitude of the effect, increasing Revision from the 
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mean of 0.65 to 1 (corresponding to pricing at the top of the range) is associated with a 3.2% 
increase in institutional allocations, while increasing Revision further, by one standard deviation to 
1.5, is associated with a 35.6% increase in relative institutional allocations.  
Consistent with our prediction that large IPOs provide more currency for compensating 
informed investors and so may diminish the fraction of the offering they will expect, we find that 
Proceeds is negatively and significantly related to institutional allocations (p<1%). Of course, this 
coefficient also reflects placings in the U.K., which tend to be smaller and exclude retail investors, 
but the coefficient on Proceeds continues to be negative and significant if we control separately 
for placings.  
Finally, we find no evidence of differences in allocations between privatizations and private-
sector IPOs. Since privatizations tend to be large IPOs, it is conceivable that their effect on 
allocations is being subsumed in Proceeds. To check whether this is the case, we interacted 
Proceeds with the privatization dummy but found no differential effect of offer size on allocations 
between private-sector IPOs and privatizations. 
 
5.3. Initial Returns 
The underpricing equation provides strong evidence consistent with the notion of discounted 
share allocations being used strategically to encourage information production. First, we see 
strong confirmation of the partial adjustment phenomenon identified by Hanley (1993) in the 
positive and statistically significant coefficient estimated for Revision (p<0.1%). Controlling for 
this effect, large institutional allocations are then associated with significantly smaller initial 
returns (p=3.9%). Other things equal, it suggests that constraints on banker discretion, which 
translate into smaller institutional allocations, increase the indirect costs of going public.  
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This result contrasts with Hanley and Wilhelm’s (1995) finding that institutional allocations 
had little explanatory power for the cross-sectional variation in initial returns. It is quite sensitive 
to our treatment of allocation policy as an endogenous variable. If we follow Hanley and Wilhelm 
and treat institutional allocations as an exogenous explanatory variable in an OLS estimation of 
the underpricing equation, we find a positive and insignificant relation between underpricing and 
institutional allocations. We interpret this as evidence of bias associated with failure to treat 
allocation policy as endogenous.  
Interestingly, the coefficient on Revision+ is not significant. This implies that particularly 
positive information does not result in greater underpricing and thus more money being left on the 
table overall. Instead, as we saw in the allocations equation, informed investors are rewarded for 
disclosing such information with particularly favorable allocations. This result contrasts with the 
findings of Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu (2001) for U.S. IPOs between 1985 and 
2000. Since the primary difference in the structure of our empirical model is our capacity to 
control for allocation policy, it appears that the inability to do so may lead to mild distortion in the 
interpretation of the partial adjustment effect.  
The coefficient estimated for IPOVol is negative as predicted but not significant, while the 
coefficient estimated for IBmktshare is negative and highly significant (p=1.3%). The former 
suggests that the indirect costs associated with underpricing are unaffected by the general level of 
primary market activity. The latter suggests that issuers who chose to employ underwriters with 
larger market shares experience lower underpricing. This result is consistent both with the notion 
of underwriter certification and with Benveniste, Busaba, and Wilhelm’s (2001) prediction that 
certain banks have sufficient market power to spread the costs of information production more 
uniformly across deals. The effect of IBmktshare is large in economic magnitude: a one standard 
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deviation increase in market share reduces underpricing from 22% to 9.2%. Interestingly, 
IBmktshare is significant only if we treat it as endogenous: otherwise, its coefficient estimate 
decreases by 90%, from –0.019 to –0.002. This mirrors the finding of Habib and Ljungqvist 
(2001) that the effect of underwriter reputation on underpricing in the U.S. changes dramatically 
when issuers are assumed to choose their underwriters endogenously.  
The post-pricing spillover variables have the expected signs and are mostly significant. In 
particular, higher initial returns elsewhere in the primary market tend to increase underpricing, 
which indicates the presence of ‘hot issue’ markets. Finally, other things equal, we find that 
companies in high-tech industries are more underpriced (p=2.1%), consistent with differences in 
ex ante uncertainty. Firm age, while negatively related to underpricing as expected, is not 
significant, nor are privatizations associated with significantly different Initial Returns.  
When Dollar Underpricing is introduced as the dependent variable, results are similar with the 
main exception that now the coefficient estimated for relative institutional allocations is not 
statistically significant. Recall that the sign of this coefficient can be interpreted as an indicator of 
the efficiency, to the issuer, of the pricing and allocation policy. A (statistically) zero coefficient is 
consistent with Habib and Ljungqvist’s (2001) argument that issuing firms (and their banks on 
their behalf) optimize over a variety of deal characteristics to maximize net proceeds (or minimize 
wealth losses): on average, allocation policy appears to be chosen such that informed investors are 
just compensated for the value of disclosing their private information, rather than in the 
expectation of monetary kickbacks from favored investors.  
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6. Robustness 
In this Section we consider potential weaknesses in the analysis and outline a variety of 
experiments conducted to assess the robustness of our findings. 
 
6.1. Selectivity bias 
Our sample of IPOs is by no means comprehensive nor is it necessarily a random sample from 
the population. Thus, selectivity bias may exist. For instance, if the willingness of issuers or banks 
to share data with us is in some way systematically related to their bookbuilding behavior or some 
other characteristics, estimates based on such data may be misleading. To explore whether 
selectivity bias is a concern, we use a Heckman (1979) correction.17 The selection equation relates 
the probability of an observation being included in our final sample to log offer size and dummies 
for the country of listing and the IPO year, using a probit on the full country samples of Table 2, 
column [1]. This equation has very good fit, with a pseudo-R2 of 47.4%, and confirms that we are 
more likely to have complete information for larger offerings outside the U.S. and especially in 
France. Including the inverse Mills’ ratio in the structural model, we find that its coefficient is 
very small in magnitude and insignificant in each of Eqs (1)-(3). A Wald test of the joint 
hypothesis that all three coefficients are zero cannot be rejected (p-value=0.57). Moreover, only 
the Proceeds coefficient estimate changes by more than two standard errors following the 
Heckman correction (causing a sign change and point estimate of 0.009) while the privatization 
dummy becomes negative and significant in Eq. (2). However, since the inverse Mills’ ratio is 
invariably insignificant, this is more likely a reflection of its collinearity with Proceeds than 
                                                           
17 For details regarding selectivity corrections in structural estimation, see Maddala, 1983, pp. 234–235. 
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evidence of selectivity bias. Thus, although the sample is not as comprehensive as we would like, 
we find no compelling evidence of selectivity bias. 
 
6.2. Normalization of institutional allocations 
The normalization of institutional allocations in the construction of Inst_Alloc is motivated by 
statistically significant differences in mean allocations across markets.18 But normalization also 
imposes a constraint on the estimation. Specifically, it is equivalent to the following: 
1. instead of a single variable Inst_Alloc, use four interaction variables which equal non-
normalized institutional allocations times a dummy equaling 1 for country i, i = 1…4; 
2. constrain the coefficients on the four interaction variables to equal β / [in-country average 
institutional allocation for country i]; 
3. estimate β. 
Step 2 assumes that our normalization makes allocations comparable across countries so that there 
is a single β. We can test this by allowing the four interaction coefficients to vary by country. In 
the Revision equation we cannot reject the hypothesis that the four interaction coefficients are 
equal. On the other hand, there is evidence that the effect on underpricing varies across countries 
when allocations are modeled with a country-specific effect. The effect is significantly stronger in 
the U.K than in Germany, where in turn it is significantly stronger than in France.  
 
6.3. Endogeneity of the offering mechanism 
                                                           
18 The standard deviations of the mean allocations reported in Table 1, exclusive of U.K. placings, are not statistically 
different across markets with the marginal exception of the comparison between the U.S. and Germany. However, we 
have allowed for such differences in experiments with a normalization that measures the number of standard 
deviations from the in-market average institutional allocation. The results are available upon request but our 
conclusions are not sensitive to the alternative specification.  
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Arguably, issuers have some ability to choose the mechanism through which they offer shares 
to the public, and so the constraints they are subject to.19 For instance, French and British firms 
could list in a less constrained country, assuming the additional cost of issuing abroad does not 
outweigh the benefit derived from escaping local constraints. We test this hypothesis using a 
variant of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test of the null hypothesis that BB_constraints is exogenous. 
The test is based on the difference in coefficients estimated under the null of exogeneity (Table 5) 
and the alternative of endogeneity. In our data, the test does not reject the null that BB_constraints 
is exogenous (χ2=0.06, p=81.1%). The same holds for BB_placings (χ2=0.11, p=73.7%).  
 
6.4. U.K. Placings 
Pooling U.K. placings with other offering types yields benefits in estimation in terms of 
sample size. On the other hand, including U.K. placings may bias our estimation against finding 
significant effects, because there is little variation in their Inst_Alloc. For example, estimating the 
allocation equation only for U.K. placings, we would expect to obtain coefficient estimates close 
to zero because of the absence of allocation discretion. Estimation with the pooled sample might 
therefore lead to understatement of the effects of the explanatory variables.  
To examine this possibility, we interact (1- BB_placings) with a variety of the right-hand-side 
variables in the structural model’s three equations. The interaction coefficient estimates capture 
the effects of each variable on non-placings and therefore can be compared to the coefficients 
reported in Table 5. Wald tests indicate that the interaction coefficients are not statistically 
different from the coefficients reported in Table 5 either jointly (χ2=0.99, p=98.6%) or 
individually (p values ranging from 39% to 97.7%). Standard errors are somewhat larger, as we 
                                                           
19 We are grateful to the referee and to Tim Jenkinson for alerting us to this possibility. 
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would expect, but our central conclusions do not change.20 We interpret these findings as 
indicating that our results are not colored by the presence of U.K. placings.  
 
6.5. Non-linear allocation effects 
Allocations may have a non-linear effect on revisions and IPO initial returns. We investigate 
this possibility by defining a variable Inst_Alloc+ which equals (the instrumented) Inst_Alloc if 
Inst_Alloc>X, and zero otherwise. Different values of X correspond to different notions of 
‘particularly large’ institutional allocations. We find no evidence of non-linearities in the effect of 
allocations on revisions. There is, however, weak evidence that underpricing is further diminished 
in cases where institutions receive allocations that exceed in-market averages by more than 10%, 
although all other relations are unaffected. 
 
6.6. Alternative specifications 
The structure of the model estimated in Table 5 depends heavily on (or alternatively, is 
constrained by) a broad interpretation of the Benveniste-Spindt theoretical framework. The signs 
of the coefficients for the conditioning variables are strongly consistent with the theory and jointly 
highly significant, indicating good fit. But of course, this does not rule out biases associated with 
omitted variables or other model misspecifications. Since many of the exogenous variables 
excluded from one or more of the structural equations have been included in extant, reduced-form 
analyses, we have experimented with various alternative specifications that involve including 
additional exogenous variables in each equation, subject to the identification constraints. Unless 
otherwise indicated, the central findings outlined in Section 5 are robust to these experiments. 
                                                           
20 These results also are available upon request. 
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In the revision equation, a noteworthy finding is a positive and statistically significant 
interaction between Inst_Alloc and the privatization dummy variable. In other words, a given 
increase in institutional allocations has a stronger effect on price revisions for privatizations. This 
finding is consistent with two non-mutually exclusive conjectures. First, privatizations often start 
from a lower base because allocation policies are explicitly designed to favor retail investors. 
Perhaps there are non-linear effects from allocation policy associated with rapidly diminishing 
marginal returns to the incentive effects of discretionary allocation.  Moreover, because 
privatizations are typically large, a given increase in institutional allocations implies a larger dollar 
allocation to institutions than in the typical private-sector IPO. Perhaps this larger dollar allocation 
‘buys’ more information production.  
In the allocation equation, the primary finding from including additional exogenous variables 
is weak evidence that the spillover variables m_RevisionBB, MktRetBB, and m_IRBB are negatively 
related to the fraction of the offering allocated to institutional investors. This could be interpreted 
as evidence that when more information spills over from the price revisions and underpricing of 
contemporaneous offerings as well as from broader market movements, there is less need to 
induce information production among institutional investors in the offering at hand. 
The underpricing equation is the most widely explored in the existing literature. In light of 
Loughran and Ritter’s (2001) finding of ‘partial adjustment’ to public information, including 
MktRetBB and σ_MktBB in Eq. (3) seems a particularly useful exercise because it permits a test of 
whether recent market returns are fully incorporated in offer prices. In contrast to Loughran and 
Ritter, we find no evidence of partial adjustment to these measures of public information. 
Similarly, we find no evidence of direct effects associated with information spilling over from 
contemporaneous offerings. The stability of the remaining coefficient estimates suggests an 
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absence of omitted variable bias in the original specification but the increase in standard errors 
suggests collinearity associated with the inclusion of the spillover variables. This is consistent 
with these variables being important determinants of Revision, which in turn is instrumented in 
part using these variables. We interpret this as evidence that the spillover variables have no direct 
effect on underpricing but have an indirect influence through their influence on price revisions 
reflected in the difference between indicative and offer prices. 
Throughout the paper we have used a directional measure of price revisions. An alternative 
specification suggested by Hanley (1993) uses the absolute value of this directional measure. This 
specification enables estimation of the effect of explanatory variables on the magnitude but not the 
direction of information acquired during bookbuilding. Re-estimation of Eq. (1) using this 
specification yields little additional insight. This is a reflection of the fact that only 50 of the 641 
sample offerings experience negative revisions, which in turn is a reflection of the fact that poorly 
received offerings are often withdrawn (see Benveniste, Ljungqvist, Wilhelm, and Yu, 2001, for 
related evidence from the U.S.).  
Finally, Ljungqvist et al. (2001) find that pricing is influenced by both the presence of a U.S. 
bank as a senior member of the syndicate and the marketing of shares to U.S. investors. 
Accounting for this leaves all our results unchanged without generating significant insights. This 
is not surprising in view of the fact that France, Germany and the U.K. are among the most highly 
developed European markets where U.S. investors and U.S. banks have the least impact on the 
margin (Ljungqvist et al., 2001). 
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7. Conclusion 
If our empirical model, structured around the mechanism-design framework introduced by 
Benveniste and Spindt (1989), is an accurate representation of the incentive structure of primary 
equity markets, there appears to be evidence of a strategic link between allocations and measures 
of price discovery and cost. On net, discretion appears a good thing: it allows issuers to set more 
informed prices and thus minimize the wealth loss of going public.  
Having said this, we recognize that discretion could be used to undermine the interests of 
issuing firms. For example, underpricing coupled with favoring institutional investors in the U.S. 
might reflect bankers serving their own interests and those of repeat investors. The alleged 
kickbacks discussed in the context of the SEC’s current investigation represent an extreme 
manifestation of this conjecture. Loughran and Ritter (2001) suggest that issuing firms might 
willingly put up with this kind of behavior even if it has no apparent benefit for them. Although 
our findings are not consistent with this hypothesis, direct investigations of proprietary records, 
such as those currently underway in the U.S., might very well reveal evidence of unsavory 
behavior. But at a minimum, our results do provide tentative evidence that even if banks are self-
serving in their exercise of discretion over the allocation of IPO shares, there appear to be benefits 
for issuing firms as well. 
We qualify our conclusions because of the political nature of the question at hand and the fact 
that our sample period does not include the dot.com boom that appears the primary focus of 
regulatory investigations. But we also recognize that failure to reject the theoretical structure used 
in the analysis obviously does not imply that it accurately describes reality. On the other hand, the 
mechanism design framework provides an attractive null hypothesis if for no other reason than 
that it implies a good deal more structure than alternative theoretical perspectives. The framework 
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is not a theory of underpricing. Rather it is a theory of the intermediary function given a particular 
incentive structure in the primary market and the early stages of the secondary market. In this 
sense, the theoretical framework subsumes Rock’s (1986) winner’s curse model (Benveniste and 
Wilhelm, 1990) and by way of the extension in Biais et al. (1999), subsumes the agency concerns 
raised by Baron (1982). In contrast to the estimation of reduced-form models more typical of the 
literature, we have tested a structural model built on this theory. We have not attempted to address 
the relative explanatory power of competing theories. However, the fact that our estimation of the 
structural model is so fully consistent with the theory leads us to believe that our conclusions are 
less likely spurious inferences regarding the linkage between allocation discretion and market 
efficiency. 
Appendix A. Offer rules and mechanisms in Germany 
 
Offer mechanisms 
Issuers can choose freely between fixed-price offerings, auctions, and bookbuilding.  
 
Allocation rules 
Fixed-price offerings can be allocated in a discretionary fashion. Unless chosen by the issuer, there 
are no pro rata requirements etc. 
 
In auctions, orders are filled in descending order. The limit set for the last order met determines 
the single strike price of the auction. 
 
Individual exchanges can, in principle, impose restrictions on IPO allocations as part of their 
listing requirements. The Neuer Markt in Frankfurt, by far the most important exchange for IPOs 
in Germany, requires issuers to adhere to the allocation guidelines of the Exchange Expert 
Commission at the Federal Ministry of Finance.  
 
The guidelines were issued on June 7, 2000 (that is, after our sample period). They are largely 
aimed at increasing the transparency of the allocation process. For instance, they require that the 
percentage allocated to retail investors be published after the conclusion of the offer. Article 12 
deals with allocations to retail investors in the case of oversubscription after a bookbuilding 
exercise. The article is aimed at ruling out ‘subjective’ criteria for determining allocations. It 
recommends issuers draw lots, allocate pro rata (within certain order sizes or across the offer as a 
whole), allocate according to time priority, or some other ‘objective criteria’. The article applies 
only to ‘fair’ treatment within the retail allocation, not to allocations to institutions or the relative 
split between institutional and retail allocations. 
 
Prior to the issuance of these guidelines, IPO allocations were absolutely at the 
issuer’s/syndicate’s discretion. 
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Appendix B. Offer rules and mechanisms in France 
 
Table B1: French methods of bringing securities to listing.  
 
Method Description 
 
Offre à prix minimal  
(previously known as Mise en vente) 
 
Invitation to the public to bid for securities of the issuer at or above a 
pre-specified minimum price. Bids must be limit orders; market orders 
are automatically deleted. Once bids are received, ‘excessively high’ 
bids are discarded. The Paris Bourse sets the single strike price at which 
orders are filled using the limit set on the last order met. If demand is 
excessive, the OPM can be repeated at a higher minimum price, or it 
can be converted into an offre à prix ferme (see below) at a (higher) 
fixed price. 
 
Offre à prix ferme 
 
Invitation to the public to subscribe for securities of the issuer at a fixed 
price (set in advance unless accompanied by a placement garanti, see 
below). Allocations are non-discretionary (pro-rated) except that issuers 
may invite subscriptions in Category A (usually up to 100 shares) and 
Category B (more than 100 shares) with preferential treatment (more 
favorable allocation/bid ratios) in Category A. In case of excessive 
demand (allocation/bid ratios below 0.8%), the OPF may be repeated at 
a higher fixed price. If combined with a placement garanti, the price set 
in the OPF cannot exceed the price set in the placement. 
 
Placement garanti Invitation to investors to participate in bookbuilding. Issuers may 
reserve the right to alter the price range. Allocations are at the 
bookrunner’s discretion. In principle open to both retail and institutional 
investors.  
 
Offre à prix ouvert Invitation to (usually) retail investors to submit price/quantity bids 
within the indicative price range (limits included). Issuers may reserve 
the right to alter the price range. Always accompanied by a placement 
garanti aimed at institutional investors. Allocations are non-
discretionary conditional on the price bid, though as in an OPF, issuers 
can invite bids in Category A and B with preference shown to smaller 
orders. Introduced July 24, 1998. 
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 Appendix C. Offer rules and mechanisms in the United Kingdom 
 
Table C1: U.K. methods of bringing securities to listing (Yellow Book, chapter 4). 
 
Method Description 
  
Placings The marketing of securities in issue but not listed or not yet in issue to 
specified persons or clients of the sponsor or any securities house 
assisting in the placing, which does not involve an offer to the public or 
to existing holders of the issuer’s securities generally. 
 
  
Public offers  
   Offer for sale Invitation to the public by, or on behalf of, a third party to purchase 
securities of the issuer already in issue (and may be in the form of an 
invitation to tender at or above a stated minimum price). Thus typically 
applies to secondary sales of existing shares. 
 
   Offer for subscription  Invitation to the public by, or on behalf of, an issuer to subscribe for 
securities of the issuer not yet in issue (and may be in the form of an 
invitation to tender at or above a stated minimum price). Thus applies to 
new shares. 
 
   Open offer Invitation to existing holders of securities to subscribe or purchase 
securities in proportion to their holdings. Used in IPOs where existing 
shareholders are given the right to purchase shares pro-rata (e.g. spin-
offs, demergers or listings by means of a reverse takeover). 
 
  
Hybrids: Placing combined with...   
   Intermediaries offer The marketing of securities already or not yet in issue, by means of an 
offer by, or on behalf of, the issuer to intermediaries (i.e. Stock 
Exchange member firms) for them to allocate to their own clients. 
 
   Public offer Defined as above. 
 
  
Global offers The marketing of securities in issue but not listed or not yet in issue to 
investors at large, registered for sale to the public, within and outside 
the United Kingdom. Allocation is at the issuer’s discretion. 
 
Introduction A method of bringing securities to listing not involving an issue of new 
securities or any marketing of existing securities because the securities 
are already widely held by the public. 
 
 
 
In addition, issuers can use “such other method as may be accepted by the London Stock 
Exchange (LSE) either generally or in a particular case”.  
 
The terminology ‘public offer’, as short-hand for a combined offer for sale and offer for 
subscription, is used where the offer includes both existing and new shares, though we shall use it 
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as a collective noun for fixed-price offers. Public offers must be advertised in at least one national 
newspaper and are open to all.  
 
In placings, shares are offered selectively, usually to City institutions. Private investors cannot 
normally apply. Shares may be set aside for employees. 
 
Rules regarding choice of offer method 
 
Until 1991, placings were allowed for offers raising up to £15 million, with public offers being 
mandatory for larger issues. Following the Initial Public Offers Review, chaired by Graham Ross 
Russell and which reported in July 1990, the LSE expanded the use of placings subject to making 
retail participation in IPOs mandatory for issues exceeding certain monetary thresholds. The new 
rules came into effect in January 1991. Companies offering between £15 million and £30 million 
were allowed to place their shares subject to the requirement that 75% or £15 million of the offer, 
whichever was the lesser, had to be offered to the public. The offer element could be satisfied via a 
traditional public offer or via the newly introduced ‘intermediaries offer’. Issues raising more than 
£30 million should still come as public offers but the sponsor was free to place up to 50%. Issues 
raising less than £15 million should be conducted as placings. On 1 December 1993, the 
thresholds were raised. Below £25 million: placing. Between £25 million and £50 million: 
mandatory public offer component. Above £50 million: mandatory public offer.  
 
From January 1995, the LSE allowed scientific research based companies to choose freely 
between placings, public offers and hybrids without regard to offer size (Amendment 4). In 
January 1996, the LSE abolished restrictions on retail participation for all types of issuers. 
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Appendix D. Typical pricing sequences 
 
Calendar days relative to first trading day (t=0), averages based on our samples. 
 
 
France  
(pure and hybrid bookbuilding) 
 
t-20 preliminary prospectus, containing non-binding indicative price range, filed with and approved by the 
market regulator (COB – Commission des Opérations de Bourse) 
 pre-marketing to institutions 
t-10 bookbuilding (placement garanti with or without offre à prix ouvert) opens: investors can submit their 
bids 
t-5 the issue is priced; if hybrid offering, offre à prix ferme opens 
t=0 trading begins 
 
 
Germany 
(bookbuilding) 
 
t-14 preliminary prospectus released to public  
 pre-marketing to institutions 
t-10 non-binding indicative price range set 
t-9 price range published as amendment to preliminary prospectus 
t-8 bookbuilding opens: institutions and retail investors can submit their bids 
t-3 the issue is priced 
t=0 trading begins 
 
 
 
United Kingdom 
(placing and hybrids) 
 
t-27 ‘pathfinder prospectus’ released to selected institutions. (This is similar to a ‘red herring’ in the U.S. 
though it does not (usually) contain a price range. Instead, the institutions are given a price indication 
that is not otherwise widely disseminated.) 
 pre-marketing to institutions 
t-10 ‘impact day’: the issue is priced and the final prospectus is made available to all interested investors. 
Investors can now apply for shares. 
t=0 trading begins 
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Table 1. Institutional IPO allocations by country of listing. 
Rules on allocation discretion are formulated at the level of the country of listing, not the country of origin, so we 
report allocations by country of listing. Where a company lists in more than one country, we define its main listing 
as being in its home country, or if it only lists abroad as the country where the bulk of the offering is conducted. For 
instance, the Spanish company Terra Networks SA, which obtained listings on the stock exchanges of Madrid, 
Bilbao, Barcelona and Valencia as well as on Nasdaq, is classified as listing in Spain. Listings on EASDAQ are 
classified as Belgian (since Belgian law and regulations apply). Institutional and retail allocations sum to 100% of 
the shares sold. In most countries (including France, Germany, the U.K., and the U.S.), shares sold include 
overallotment shares where the overallotment option is exercised. Shares allocated to employees or to ‘friends and 
family’ are counted as retail allocations. We have no allocation data for IPOs in Ireland, the 15th EU country. (But 
we do have allocation data for Irish companies going public abroad, in particular in the U.K.) Data for U.K. placings 
take into account shares set aside for employees, which are counted as retail allocations. 
 
Country N  Mean St.dev. Min Max 
United Kingdom 843 0.929 0.164 0.000 1.000 
Placings 651 0.996 0.032 0.350 1.000 
Public offers 6 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Hybrids and global 186 0.725 0.181 0.136 1.000 
France 244 0.761 0.182 0.000 1.000 
Germany 144 0.577 0.209 0.000 1.000 
Italy 52 0.637 0.154 0.000 0.972 
Sweden 47 0.696 0.230 0.000 1.000 
Belgium 45 0.650 0.215 0.210 1.000 
Finland 40 0.764 0.159 0.300 0.300 
Netherlands 29 0.680 0.201 0.000 0.927 
Spain 27 0.739 0.232 0.250 0.974 
Portugal 18 0.595 0.276 0.000 1.000 
Denmark 10 0.672 0.246 0.300 0.972 
Greece 3 0.131 0.146 0.045 1.000 
Austria 1 0.725    
Luxembourg 1 0.974    
EU15 1,504 0.823 0.223 0.000 1.000 
Hungary 14 0.804 0.200 0.342 1.000 
Poland 10 0.777 0.103 0.571 0.937 
Norway 7 0.624 0.376 0.000 0.929 
Croatia 1 0.629    
Iceland 1 0.000    
Switzerland 1 0.800    
non-EU15 Europe 34 0.730 0.258 0.000 1.000 
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Table 1. Institutional IPO allocations by country of listing (cont’d). 
 
Country N  Mean St.dev. Min Max 
Singapore 60 0.590 0.246 0.000 0.925 
Hong Kong 19 0.650 0.200 0.253 0.940 
South Africa 9 0.423 0.335 0.000 0.899 
Turkey 8 0.752 0.141 0.498 0.906 
Australia 6 0.629 0.172 0.350 0.852 
Thailand 4 0.676 0.049 0.602 0.700 
China 3 0.933 0.115 0.800 1.000 
Malaysia 2 0.837 0.231 0.674 1.000 
Bahrain 1 0.528    
Canada 1 0.800    
Indonesia 1 0.804    
Israel 1 0.932    
Japan 1 0.500    
Lebanon 1 1.000    
Philippines 1 0.833    
Venezuela 1 0.822    
Rest of World 119 0.628 0.243 0.000 1.000 
United States 32 0.663 0.155 0.000 1.000 
Total 1,689 0.804 0.230 0.000 1.000 
Total w/o U.K. placings and public offers 1,032 0.687 0.213 0.000 1.000 
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Table 2. Sample characteristics. 
 
  
Whole sample 
[1] 
w/ allocation 
data 
[2] 
w/ allocation, 
price range data 
[3] 
t-test (z-test 
for medians): 
[1]=[2] 
t-test (z-test 
for medians): 
[2]=[3] 
France      
Number of observations 516 244 237   
Pure bookbuilding 43 26 26   
Hybrid bookbuilding 212 211 204   
Fixed-price offering 44 7 7   
Auction 185 0 0   
Gross proceeds ($m): mean 74.125 143.805 146.500 1.741 0.046 
Gross proceeds ($m): median 7.129 13.740 14.387 7.979*** 0.394 
Underpricing (%) 16.5 17.1 17.4 0.205 0.089 
Institutional allocations (%) n.a. 76.1 76.0 – 0.057 
Fraction privatizations (%) 3.1 4.9 4.6 1.181 0.142 
      
Germany      
Number of observations 470 144 141   
Bookbuilding 377 141 141   
Fixed-price offering 92 2 0   
Auction 1 1 0   
Gross proceeds ($m): mean 131.371 236.875 241.492 1.312 – 
Gross proceeds ($m): median 39.738 35.648 37.526 0.136 – 
Underpricing (%) 40.2 49.0 49.4 1.264 – 
Institutional allocations (%) n.a. 57.7 58.4 – – 
Fraction privatizations (%) 1.1 1.4 1.4 0.321 – 
      
United Kingdom      
Number of observations 876 843 231   
Placing 651 651 126   
Public offer 12 6 0   
Hybrid 178 168 87   
Global offer 35 18 18   
Gross proceeds ($m): mean 92.534 87.446 261.614 0.344 6.200*** 
Gross proceeds ($m): median 15.485 15.164 51.687 0.318 10.504*** 
Underpricing (%) 39.6 32.0 11.9 0.915 2.398** 
Institutional allocations (%) n.a. 93.0 86.3 – 5.286*** 
Fraction privatizations (%) 3.1 3.2 11.3 0.144 5.050*** 
      
United States       
Number of observations 2,353 32 32   
Gross proceeds ($m): mean 110.400 315.984 315.984 3.523*** – 
Gross proceeds ($m): median 50.000 172.250 172.250 5.541*** – 
Underpricing (%) 11.9 8.9 8.9 2.046** – 
Institutional allocations (%) n.a. 66.3 66.3 – – 
Fraction privatizations (%) n.a. 0.0 0.0 – – 
      
All four      
Number of observations 6,403 1,263 641   
Gross proceeds ($m): mean 75.387 121.744 215.292 4.214*** 3.067*** 
Gross proceeds ($m): median 27.788 18.570 31.434 7.887*** 8.721*** 
Underpricing (%) 25.8 30.6 22.0 1.661* 1.925* 
Institutional allocations (%) n.a. 85.4 75.4 – 9.833*** 
Fraction privatizations (%) n.a. 3.3 6.1 – 2.895*** 
      
 
***, **, * = significant at 1%, 5%, 10% (two-tailed tests). 
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Table 3. Definition of variables. 
 
Variable name Definition 
Endogenous variables  
Revision equals (Offer price – Plow) / (Phigh – Plow), where Phigh and Plow are the high and 
low end of the indicative price range, respectively 
Revision+ equals Revision if Revision >1 (offer price set above the indicative range), and 
0 otherwise 
Inst_Alloc equals the fraction of shares allocated to institutions in IPO i divided by the 
average fraction of shares allocated to institutions in all local offerings i ≠ j in 
the 90 calendar days preceding i’s first day of trading 
Initial Return equals P5 / Offer price – 1, where P5 is the firm’s share price on its fifth day 
of trading 
Proceeds equals the natural logarithm of dollar gross proceeds (in million), which is the 
offer price times the number of shares sold (including overalloted shares) 
converted into US dollars using exchange rates on the pricing day 
Dollar Underpricing equals Initial Return times the dollar gross proceeds, in million 
IBmktshare equals the lead manager’s (or if more than one, the average of the lead 
managers’) market share in the local market, in %. Market share is the sum of 
gross proceeds in all local offerings lead managed by bank j divided by total 
proceeds raised in all offerings in that local market over the sample period 
(offerings lead managed by more than one bank are allocated equally to the 
lead managers). For offerings in the U.S., market shares are computed over 
the five calendar years preceding firm i’s IPO. 
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Table 3. Definition of variables (cont’d). 
 
Variable name Definition 
Exogenous variables  
m_RevisionBB average Revision of all local offerings i ≠ j between the setting of i’s price 
range and its final pricing, weighted by the number of such offerings  
σ_RevisionBB standard deviation of Revision of all local offerings i ≠ j between the setting 
of i’s price range and its final pricing 
MktRetBB return on the local market index between the setting of i’s price range and its 
final pricing. Indices used: Germany – Datastream Germany index prior to 
January 1994 and the DAX200 thereafter; France – Datastream France index 
prior to January 1991 and the SBF250 thereafter; U.K. – FT-SE All Share 
index; U.S. – S&P 500 index.  
σ_MktBB standard deviation of local daily market index returns between the setting of 
i’s price range and its final pricing 
m_IRBB average one-day Initial Return of all local offerings i ≠ j between the setting 
of i’s price range and its final pricing 
IPOVol the number of IPOs in the same local market as issue i, during the six weeks 
before to two weeks after i’s pricing date 
MktRet post-pricing return on the local market index between i’s final pricing and the fifth day of 
trading (to coincide with the period over which Initial Returns are computed) 
σ_Mkt post-pricing standard deviation of daily local market index returns between i’s final 
pricing and the fifth day of trading  
m_IR post-pricing average one-day Initial Return of all local offerings i ≠ j between i’s final 
pricing and its fifth day of trading 
BB_constraints dummy=1 for deals subject to constraints on allocation discretion, as defined 
in Table 4 
BB_placings dummy=1 for U.K. placings, as defined in Table 4 
Privatization dummy=1 if issue i is a privatization 
Hightech dummy=1 if issue i operates in a ‘high-tech’ industry; see the text for industry 
classifications 
Age equals one plus the natural logarithm of firm age, where firm age is the IPO 
year minus the year of foundation as disclosed in IPO prospectuses 
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Table 4. Categorization of sample by restriction imposed on price discovery. 
We categorize sample IPOs into three categories on the basis of the constraints imposed on price discovery. The 
‘unrestricted’ category includes the 92 fixed-price offerings in Germany, on the grounds that underwriters retain 
allocation discretion in such deals (in contrast to, for instance, France and the U.K. where allocations in fixed-price 
deals are pro rata or balloted). The BB_constraints category includes the 185 fixed-price and 44 auction offerings in 
France, as well as one auction in Germany. 
 
 
Category 
 
Offer mechanisms 
Number of cases 
(with allocation and price 
range information) 
   
Unrestricted bookbuilding • Companies listing in the U.S. 
• Dual-tranche IPOs where tranche allocations are 
to be determined after orders have been received 
• Dual-tranche IPOs with clawback provision in 
favor of one investor class, where the clawback 
exercise is discretionary 
 
France:  245 (219) 
Germany: 469 (141) 
U.K.: 41 (18) 
U.S.: 2,353 (32) 
All: 3,108 (410) 
Deals subject to constraints 
on allocation discretion 
(BB_constraints) 
• Dual-tranche IPOs with fixed tranches (i.e. no 
possibility of clawback or reallocation) 
• Dual-tranche IPOs with clawback provision in 
favor of one investor class, where the clawback 
exercise is non-discretionary 
• Fixed-price offerings with pro-rata allocation 
• Auctions 
 
France:  239 (18) 
Germany: 1 (0) 
U.K.: 184 (87) 
U.S.: 0 (0) 
All: 424 (105) 
Deals subject to constraints 
on retail participation 
(BB_placings) 
• U.K. placings  France:  0 (0) 
Germany: 0 (0) 
U.K.: 651 (126) 
U.S.: 0 (0) 
All: 651 (126) 
 
Unclassified  France:  32 (0) 
Germany: 0 (0) 
U.K.: 0 (0) 
U.S.: 0 (0) 
All: 32 (0) 
 
All  France:  516 (237) 
Germany: 470 (141) 
U.K.: 876 (231) 
U.S.: 2,353 (32) 
All: 4,215 (641) 
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Table 5. Regression results. 
The two systems described by Eqs (1)-(3) and (1)-(3’) are estimated separately using three-stage least squares. Year 
dummies were included in the first-stage regressions. All variables are defined in Table 3. Revision, Revision+, 
Inst_Alloc, Initial Return, Proceeds, Dollar Underpricing, and IBmktshare are treated as endogenous. All other 
regressors are treated as exogenous. Standard errors are given in italics below the coefficient estimates. Number of 
observations: 641 (237 in France, 141 in Germany, 231 in the U.K., and 32 in the U.S.). ***, **, * = significant at 1%, 
5%, 10% (two-tailed Z test). 
Eq. (1) (2) (3)  (1) (2) (3’) 
Dependent var. Revision Inst_Alloc Initial Return  Revision Inst_Alloc Dollar Underpricing
       
Inst_Alloc 0.682**  –0.420** 0.858**  –135.189 
 0.343  0.203 0.360  119.016 
Revision  0.163*** 0.527***  0.176*** 85.611* 
  0.056 0.083  0.056 48.161 
Revision+  0.216** 0.030  0.214** –2.756 
  0.084 0.113  0.085 64.939 
Proceeds  –0.078***   –0.071***  
  0.023   0.023  
       
m_RevisionBB  0.004**   0.004**   
 0.002   0.002   
σ_RevisionBB –0.191***   –0.215***   
 0.046   0.049   
m_IRBB  0.214***   0.140***   
 0.046   0.049   
MktRetBB  0.890   0.907   
 0.600   0.660   
σ_MktBB  –15.661***   –13.911***   
 4.483   4.872   
BB_constraints –0.211**   –0.149   
 0.101   0.109   
BB_placings –0.286***   –0.257***   
 0.066   0.069   
IPOVol   –0.0002   0.550 
   0.001   0.849 
IBmktshare   –0.019**   –1.592 
   0.007   4.613 
MktRetpost-pricing    0.785   –116.136 
   0.592   380.462 
σ_Mkt post-pricing    –11.164***   –2809.968 
   3.488   2208.104 
m_IRpost-pricing    0.095***   34.937 
   0.035   22.780 
Privatization  0.076 0.041  0.056 195.706*** 
  0.095 0.104  0.096 65.094 
Hightech   0.082**   42.356* 
   0.036   22.944 
Age   –0.019   –9.390 
   0.015   9.535 
Constant 0.143 1.154*** 0.446** –0.035 1.122*** 121.932 
 0.364 0.090 0.203 0.382 0.091 120.300 
       
all coeff=0? (χ2) 101.8*** 35.3*** 114.0*** 85.9*** 34.8*** 40.6*** 
 
